International Studies Compendium Project

Extract

Comment on this article   Perhaps the best starting point for a survey of deterrence and crisis bargaining research is to clarify the central concept – deterrence – in order to differentiate it from related but nevertheless distinct terms. It simply refers to the persuasion of an opponent not to take an action that, it is believed, the opponent would otherwise take in the absence of the deterrent threat. Three definitional components are essential. First, deterrence is about dissuading an adversary from taking a specific action rather than compelling it into an action. The latter situation is typically identified with compellence: “The distinction is in the timing, in who has to make the first move, in whose initiative is put to the test” ( Schelling 1960 :195). Although in practice states often combine both strategies in coercive bargaining, this distinction is important at least for analytical purposes. Second, deterrence is based on the deterrer's belief that, without a threat, an adversary intends to take the prohibited action. As such, it intrinsically raises the problem of identifying deterrence success. Deterrence succeeds only if the adversary does not take the action (an observable event) but intended to do it prior to the threat – an unobservable aspect that reflects only the deterrer's beliefs about the opponent's intentions. This issue has both served as an obstacle ... log in or subscribe to read full text